Selion Perspective
The Buyer Is Also Interviewing
For owners considering a strategic investor, and the executives who may not realise they are already being assessed.
A management presentation is supposed to explain the business: its earnings, its markets, what the next five years might look like. It is also a demonstration of how the company works. Who answers without looking for permission, whether the finance director contradicts the owner when the numbers require it, and why the executive described as indispensable is saying so little.
A strategic investor is another operating company. Its people have run businesses of their own, sometimes through acquisitions that were less agreeable than the presentation suggests. They are listening to the plan, and at the same time working out whether the people who delivered the past can manage what comes next. Private equity investors say that they assess management and usually commission someone to do it. A strategic buyer does the same thing without giving the exercise a name, and sometimes without quite admitting it to itself.
Anyone who has spent a career placing executives into companies that have just taken on a partner, and sitting with owners in the months afterwards, knows how this goes and could set most of it out before the financial institution is appointed. What is unusual is that in a transaction attended by a bank, lawyers, an accountancy firm and a long table of advisers, nobody has that job. The bank's mandate is the price. The people are what the price is for.
First impressions become working assumptions
Who presents is decided on practical grounds: who knows the slides, who is available, whom the bank thinks will come across well. The buyer looks at the result as evidence of who can speak for the business, because from where it sits that is what it is. If the founder presents, the buyer concludes the company is still the founder. If a family member presents, the buyer starts to price the family. If the CEO and CFO present together, the buyer watches them as a pair.
By the second or third meeting the buyer's team has decided who holds authority, who is ready for a larger role and who will struggle when decisions are no longer made in quite the same way. Those were first impressions. By now they are the basis on which retention terms, board composition and the first year of the partnership will be negotiated. The seller does not know which conclusions have formed.
For an owner selling a minority stake, this can seem a modest matter. The owner is staying, the management team is staying, the investor says it wants a partnership, and often it does. Yet a stake comes with a board seat, with agreed rights over particular decisions, and frequently with an option to acquire more later. What matters for the people running the company is that someone new has acquired a voice in how they do their jobs, and has already formed a view of how well they do them.
The people outside the cordon
Confidentiality is necessary during a transaction. It also creates two versions of the company. A few people are inside the process, usually the owner, the CEO, the CFO and perhaps legal counsel. Everyone else continues to run the business while trying to interpret what they can see: the finance director who is repeatedly unavailable, lawyers nobody has met, a head of HR asked for employment contracts and the latest organisation chart before being included in any serious discussion about the people named in them. From the other side of a small circle, silence seldom feels neutral.
Executives respond in their own ways. One keeps hiring and taking decisions. Another delays a costly appointment until the ownership question is resolved. Someone who has declined approaches for years takes the call from a search consultant. A colleague who was vocal in meetings begins to say very little, which can be calculation, or fear, or the ordinary caution of a person who has been given no reliable information about their own future. The buyer sees the behaviour, not what produced it.
The executives who have worked longest with the founder are in a particular position. Their judgement was formed alongside the owner's, often over a decade or more. They know which supplier will come through in a crisis and why a decision that looks irregular on paper makes sense in the market.
Their loyalty has value, and the buyer was not there when it was earned.
To a new shareholder, devotion to the founder can look like dependence on the founder. The distinction matters, and it is the executive's to make. A commercial director who has opened three markets can describe what she built, which decisions were hers and what she would do differently with greater resources. The years count, once they have been made intelligible to someone who did not live through them.
What a retention payment cannot settle
Retention enters the transaction late, usually after exclusivity and as a schedule: names, amounts, dates. This has a purpose. Payments give a business time to hold knowledge and secure continuity through a difficult period. What they cannot establish is whether someone wants to work in the company that is emerging.
The research on acquired companies, which goes back forty years and has been confirmed again recently, finds that roughly half of the original top team is no longer in place two years after completion. Those are acquisitions rather than strategic minority investments, where the rights acquired and the parties' intentions vary widely, so the finding is a reason to take the question seriously rather than a forecast for any particular deal.
An executive can accept a retention payment while privately deciding to leave when it vests. Another may intend to stay and discover that the role now demands skills nobody has asked them to develop. Neither is a failure of character. A CFO who has spent fifteen years reporting to one owner, on a basis of trust rather than formality, now meets a shareholder that expects monthly reporting, closer scrutiny of capital expenditure and formal board papers. Some such CFOs adapt well; some companies need a different range of experience in the seat. Another year's salary on the retention agreement settles neither question.
Nor should every departure be counted as a failure. A transaction creates roles that did not exist: a more independent chair, a chief executive with broader operating experience, a different relationship between the founder and the finance function. Keeping everyone in place can be as damaging as changing people too quickly.
The question is which people, in which roles, will be able to lead the business under its new arrangements, and which of them want to.
The companies that see those roles coming fill them on their own terms. The ones that do not find the investor has a view about who should fill them.
The structure changes too, and it changes who stays. A strategic buyer arrives with the organisation of a large operating company, which means layers: reporting lines, controls, a level of management between itself and the people who run things. The business it has bought usually grew by having almost none of that, and by relying on a few people who build rather than coordinate. The buyer's instinct after completion is to add the layers it is used to. The builders are the people that structure drives out, and they leave without any retention clause being triggered, because nobody dismissed them. The buyer then concludes the team was thinner than it looked. This is a question worth addressing before completion and means not only who fits the new organisation but what shape it should have under two owners, and whether that shape keeps the people who make the business work or the people who report on it. Founder flatness does not survive a shareholder that needs to see what is happening; corporate layering does not survive contact with a company that grew by having none.
Something in between has to be designed, and the people best placed to say what it should be are usually the ones the layering would push out first.
The advantage the seller seldom uses
Owners have something the investor does not: a long memory of the people running the business. They know who retained a difficult customer, who recovered a failing operation and who needed the founder to intervene when a straightforward decision became uncomfortable.
That history is invaluable, and it can mislead.
Affection for a loyal executive, or reluctance to confront a weakness that has been tolerated for years, is not a measure of readiness for the next stage.
An independent look at the leadership team, undertaken early enough to shape the sale process, gives the owner something more useful than a list of people to retain. It tests where authority really sits, which roles will change under the proposed governance, and how much of the firm's success depends on habits that cannot be transferred to a new shareholder. It also asks the people concerned what they want. This is a different exercise from an assessment commissioned by the buyer, whose questions are properly framed around the buyer's interests. It belongs to the seller, and it is done before the buyer has a view.
The transaction advisers are not indifferent to these matters; the good ones think about management continuity carefully. But their work runs to its own timetable, and discussion of individual executives tends to concentrate around diligence or retention terms, when opinions on both sides have already begun to settle.
The owners who come through these transactions well tend to have done a few further things. They brought the head of HR into the thinking earlier than their advisers would have liked, so that the one executive whose job is the people had a role to play rather than a schedule to fill. They asked the investor directly what it expects of a CEO, a CFO or a country head, and how it intends to judge performance once it has a seat at the table, which is a question bankers find awkward and good buyers can answer. And they decided what their own working life should look like afterwards: which decisions will still be theirs, which will require consent, and how long they want to remain involved. Those questions most certainly deserve the same attention as the price. They concern the job a person will wake up to once the signing dinner is over.
The interview has been running for some time
By completion, the investor has watched the management team through presentations, diligence calls and the unguarded moments between them. Some of its conclusions will be fair. Some will have mistaken familiarity for competence and unfamiliarity for weakness. The owner does not have to meet those judgements unprepared. There has been time, since before the bank was appointed, to look at the team independently, to acknowledge where change is necessary, and to speak to the people whose future is being negotiated.
The interview is going to happen either way. What the owner decides is who conducts the first one.