Selion Perspective
What If the Right Move Is the Unfamiliar One?
There is a prevailing logic in senior appointments that goes roughly like this: the best predictor of success in an industry is experience in that industry. It sounds self-evident. It is also, at the level where it matters most, increasingly unsupported by the evidence.
The executive who has spent fifteen years in financial services and wonders whether she could lead in healthcare is not indulging a fantasy. She is asking a question the market itself is starting to answer, and the answer is more encouraging than most people assume. The board that needs a different kind of leader but defaults to the sector insider is confusing familiarity with fitness. And the founder who looks at a competitive market and concludes there is no space, is usually looking at the wrong thing. Typically, it is framed around whether the market is full, and not, whether it is full of anyone doing it well.
This essay is about two fears that sound different but draw from the same well. The fear of crossing into an unfamiliar industry. And the fear of entering a market where others are already present. Both rest on an overvaluation of the known, or put in another way, the assumption that what exists is what should exist, and that the safest ground is always the ground you are standing on.
“He will bring new ways of looking at things.”
When Kering announced that Luca de Meo, then CEO of Renault, would take the helm of one of the world's most prominent luxury groups, the appointment raised eyebrows in the fashion press. Here was a man whose career had been built across Fiat, Volkswagen, Audi, SEAT, and Renault — not exactly the corridors of haute couture. He had never run a fashion house. He had never worked in luxury.
But François-Henri Pinault, who had led Kering for two decades, was looking for something that industry insiders were unlikely to provide. He wanted someone who understood brand architecture, operational turnarounds, and the discipline of repositioning a portfolio under pressure. De Meo had taken Renault from eight billion euros in annual losses to growth and profitability in under two years. He had eliminated underperforming product lines, pushed the brand upmarket, and renegotiated a complex global partnership with Nissan. None of this was fashion experience. All of it was leadership experience, and it was precisely what Kering needed.
Shareholders agreed. The appointment was ratified with 98.97 percent of the vote.
This was not a fluke, and it was not new. When IBM brought in Lou Gerstner from RJR Nabisco in 1993, the technology press was sceptical. Gerstner had spent his career in food, tobacco, and management consulting. What could he possibly understand about mainframes and middleware? As it turned out, IBM's problem was not technical. It was organisational for a company that had lost its ability to see itself clearly. Gerstner understood customers, business models, and what it takes to dismantle an operating structure that has outlived its purpose. The turnaround became a case study that business schools are still teaching three decades later.
When Alan Mulally moved from Boeing to Ford in 2006, he inherited a company losing billions annually and teetering toward the kind of government bailout that would eventually engulf its competitors. Mulally had spent his entire career in aerospace. He knew nothing about cars. But he understood systems, engineering discipline, and how to unify a sprawling organisation around one strategic plan. Ford's stock more than doubled during his tenure, and the company navigated the 2008 financial crisis without a single dollar of government rescue.
The pattern maintains its stance when you step back from the anecdotes and look at the research. A study by Jalal and Prezas at Suffolk University, analysing more than five hundred external CEO successions over sixteen years, found that companies hiring chief executives from outside their industry initially underperformed those that hired from within. But a short few years later, the picture reversed. The cross-industry hires posted better stock returns, paid more dividends to shareholders, and demonstrated stronger operating performance. The initial market scepticism and the "interesting but risky" reflex, gave way to results.
The leaders who cross industries successfully do not abandon what they knew. They carry it into a context where it has never been tested, and that is where it becomes most useful.
So why does the hesitation persist?
Part of it is structural. Most executive search processes are organised by industry vertical, which means the infrastructure of career movement is itself designed to keep people in their lane. Specifications, most of the time, get written with sector-specific experience as a threshold requirement rather than one factor among several. Boards gravitate toward pattern recognition. In other words, the candidate who "looks like" a successful leader in their sector because it reduces the perceived risk of the appointment. In a meeting full of directors that will be judged on the outcome, the familiar candidate is the easier decision to defend.
But the deeper resistance is personal, and it operates with a force that process alone cannot explain.
Herminia Ibarra, the organisational behaviour scholar at London Business School whose research on professional identity transitions is among the most cited in the field, describes what happens when senior people contemplate a move into unfamiliar territory. The fear is not really about competence. It is about coherence, or the threat to a professional self that took decades to construct. Ibarra's concept of "working identity" captures something that most career advice ignores entirely: our sense of who we are professionally is not a fixed trait but a living narrative, assembled over years from the roles we have held, the expertise we have accumulated, and even more, the stories we tell about our trajectories. To cross into a new sector is to put that narrative at risk. The executive is not worried about learning a new industry. She is reckoning with the prospect of walking into a new office where the version of herself she has carefully built has less weight than it did yesterday.
Anyone who has been through this or watched someone go through it, will recognise the particular vertigo it produces. It is the distance between knowing you are capable and being unable to prove it in the currency the new surrounding recognises.
Ibarra's research suggests that this is exactly where most people get stuck, and that the conventional remedy makes it worse. The standard advice says: first work out who you want to become, then act accordingly. Ibarra argues it works the other way around. Identity shifts begin with experimentation, with what she calls "possible selves" — provisional versions of who we might become, tested through action rather than planned through reflection. The executives who successfully cross sectors are seldom the ones who had a tidy plan. They are the ones who tolerated ambiguity for a new version of their professional self to emerge from the doing.
For the hiring organisation, the resistance runs along a different track. Bringing in an outsider from another sector is an implicit acknowledgement that the existing talent pool and the people who rose through the ranks, who absorbed the culture, and who learned the unwritten rules, may not be what this moment requires. That is a difficult message for any board to send, particularly to an internal leadership team already under pressure. It is simpler, and politically safer, to frame the specification in terms that require deep industry knowledge. The requirement becomes a defence mechanism dressed up as rigour.
The result is a kind of mutual paralysis. And both sides miss the appointment that might have mattered most.
The same instinct — reach for the familiar, treat the known as synonymous with the safe — shapes how people read markets, and it produces a version of the same error.
The refrain is everywhere, particularly across Asia and the Middle East where the pace of market creation has been extraordinary over the past decade. "The market is saturated." "There is too much competition." "The world does not need another investment firm, another platform, another brand."
It sounds like sober realism. More often, it is a misdiagnosis.
Peter Thiel's argument in Zero to One that the greatest businesses escape competition entirely, has become a kind of received wisdom among founders and investors. And in Silicon Valley, where network effects and proprietary technology can produce genuine monopolies, the thesis has teeth. But for most leaders operating in professional services, consumer markets, or advisory businesses across Europe, Asia, and the Gulf, the framework is less useful than it first appears. Most of us are not building platforms with winner-take-all dynamics. We are building practices, brands, and reputations in markets that already exist and that reward distinctiveness over dominance.
In those markets, competition is almost never the obstacle. Sameness is.
Research from Stanford, led by Thatchenkery and Katila and published in Organization Science, examined 121 firms across the enterprise software industry over a seventeen-year period. The finding that matters here is not that competition is good in the abstract; it is that firms with an unusual view of their competitive landscape were measurably more innovative. Specifically, those that paid attention to peripheral competitors, the ones operating at the fringes rather than the obvious market leaders, generated more new products. Competition, the researchers found, expands the range of approaches firms are willing to consider. It is conformity and applying the instinct to watch only the biggest players and replicate what they do, that narrows it.
The implications reach well beyond technology. When someone says "the market is too crowded," what they usually mean is that the market is full of people doing similar things in similar ways. That is not evidence of saturation. It is an invitation, specifically, an invitation to do it differently enough that the comparison stops being relevant. And more often than not, the difference comes down to a single discipline: excellence in whatever is being offered.
Horst Schulze understood this better than almost anyone. When he co-founded Ritz-Carlton in 1983, the luxury hotel market was not short of operators. It was short of operators who treated service as the entire proposition rather than as an accessory to the room. His insistence that every employee, from the doorman to the general manager, was "a lady or gentleman serving ladies and gentlemen", sounded almost quaint at the time. It turned out to be the thing that built a brand, earned two Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Awards, and allowed Schulze to do it a second time with Capella Hotels a decade later, entering a market that by every conventional measure was even more saturated than the one he had originally disrupted.
The market was never crowded. It was undifferentiated. There is a difference.
The firms that have built enduring positions in crowded markets, be it in some form of advisory, in luxury hospitality, in wealth management, did not arrive first. They arrived with a point of view the incumbents were not offering. They found the gap between what the market was providing and what discerning clients actually wanted. That gap is almost never about price or scale. It is about judgement, specificity, and the willingness to serve a narrower audience with greater depth.
The market that is full of generic competitors is not closed. It is waiting for someone who refuses to be generic.
There is a structural shift underway that makes both of these arguments. It is the case for crossing industries, and the case for entering competitive markets more urgent than they were five years ago.
The global conversation about skills-based hiring has reached a tipping point. TestGorilla's 2025 State of Skills-Based Hiring report found that 85 percent of employers now use skills-based practices, and more than half have actively dropped formal degree requirements for certain roles. Google, IBM, and Bank of America are among the large employers that have removed four-year degree prerequisites across substantial parts of their workforces. Two thirds of employers using skills-based methods report reduced mis-hires, and a similar proportion say employees hired this way stay longer in their roles.
This shift is most visible at junior and mid-career levels, but it is moving up. At the most senior level, the equivalent of skills-based hiring is the recognition that leadership capability transfers across sectors. It also means, that the executive who has built high-performing teams and navigated regulatory complexity, managed a P&L through a downturn, and earned the trust of a board, has done something more portable than simply "knowing the industry." The industry can be learned. The judgement, the composure, the ability to read an organisation and understand what it needs before it can articulate it — these belong to the leader, not to the sector.
DDI's Global Leadership Forecast 2025, surveying nearly eleven thousand leaders across more than fifty countries, found that 71 percent of leaders report increased stress and 40 percent have considered stepping away from leadership roles entirely. The latter in itself is astonishing. The leadership pipeline is thinning precisely when the demands on it are growing. Organisations that restrict their search to sector insiders are drawing from a pool that is already under strain and competing with every other firm in their industry for the same small group of proven names.
The arithmetic alone makes a case for looking wider. But the better argument is qualitative. The most consequential leadership appointments of the past two decades — the ones that genuinely altered a company's direction — have disproportionately involved someone who brought a perspective the existing team could not generate on its own. Not because the internal team lacked talent, but because shared assumptions had become invisible to the people who held them.
None of this is a suggestion that industry knowledge does not matter. It does. Understanding the regulatory landscape of financial services, the supply chain cadence of manufacturing, or the guest psychology that drives luxury hospitality — these are real competencies, and they take time to acquire.
The argument is narrower and, we think, more honest: industry knowledge is necessary but it is rarely sufficient, and at the most senior level, it is almost never the factor that determines whether a leader succeeds or fails. What determines success is the quality of their thinking, the depth of their self-awareness, the strength of the teams they build, and their ability to make sound decisions when the information is incomplete and the stakes are high. These are transferable. They are also the hardest things to assess — and the most important things to get right.
The discomfort that accompanies an unfamiliar move, whether into a new sector or into a market where others are already present, is worth interrogating rather than obeying. Ibarra's research is useful here: the conventional instinct is to wait for certainty before acting, to resolve the identity question before stepping into the new role. But the evidence runs the other way. Clarity tends to follow action, not precede it. The executive who crosses into a new industry does not leave her expertise behind; she takes it somewhere it has never been tested, and that is often where it becomes most valuable. The founder who enters a market with established players is not arriving late. She is arriving with the advantage of seeing what the incumbents have normalised, and what they have failed to question.
The market is not saturated with excellence. It is saturated with adequacy. And the leadership pipeline is not short of talent. It is short of the willingness — on both sides of the appointment — to look past the familiar and consider what a different kind of experience might make possible.
The best appointments tend to involve a degree of discomfort. For example, a CV that does not fit the template, or a background that requires explanation. A bet on capability over pedigree. That discomfort is not a warning signal. More often than not, it is the surest sign that something worth doing is about to happen.
This is, in the end, a question of what kind of advisory you trust with appointments that carry this level of consequence. The large institutional firms do important work, and they do it at scale. But the appointments we are describing here — the ones that require a board to look past its own assumptions, to consider a leader whose value lies precisely in what they bring from outside — demand a different kind of conversation. One that is partner-led from the first meeting, grounded in the psychology of leadership as much as the mechanics of search, and conducted with the discretion that comes from operating at this level across cultures and geographies for a long time. The willingness to recommend the unfamiliar candidate, and to make the case for why that discomfort is warranted, is not a feature of scale. It is a feature of judgement. And judgement is not something that can be industrialised.
Selion Global | Singapore, London | International Partner Offices
Selion Global is a partner-led executive search and leadership advisory firm working with boards, founders, and senior leaders on the appointments and transitions that define what follows. Our practice spans Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond — advising at the intersection of leadership, culture, and organisational psychology. The Selion Perspective is where our thinking lives between mandates.